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Abstract
We examine the eﬀectiveness of trade liberalization of an environmental good and a ﬁnal
good in a small open economy. The environmental good is the one which contribute to
reducing an emission of pollution. We will show that a reduction in the tariﬀ on the
environmental good may decrease the welfare of the country when the initial tariﬀ on the
ﬁnal good is suﬃciently high. The optimal tariﬀ on the environmental good becomes
smaller when the government reduces the tariﬀ on the ﬁnal good and chooses the optimal
emission tax.
Keywords : Trade and environmental policies, Eco-industry, Environmental goods, Trade
liberalization
．Introduction
The relationship between trade liberalization and the environment has been an important
issue in trade negotiations for many years. Since international trade may degrade the
quality of the environment, countries can take trade measures to protect it even under the
World Trade Organization (WTO) rule. The main issue so far has been to protect the
environment by reducing the volume of trade in ﬁnal goods which degrade the quality of
environment.
Recently, however, the current trade negotiation of the WTO is focusing on trade
liberalization in environmental goods that may contribute to improving the quality of
environment. The EU, the United States and 15 other members of the WTO have been
negotiating an Environmental Goods Agreement (EGA) to remove barriers to trade in
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regard to environmental goods since July 2014. The main objective of the agreement is to
increase the trade volume of environmental goods that contribute to the environmental
protection, and in particular ﬁght against climate change.
The quality of environment in an open economy is obviously aﬀected by international
trade of both ﬁnal and environmental goods. Therefore, we cannot discuss eﬀects of trade
liberalization of these goods independently. The eﬀects of trade liberalization of environ-
mental goods should be examined in the context of the liberalization of ﬁnal goods.
There are many papers on international trade and environmental policies which incorpo-
rate environmental goods or eco-industries but do not include trade policies in ﬁnal goods,
e.g., Baumol (1995), Feess and Muehlheusser (2002), Brock and Boadu (2004), Carpentier
et al. (2005), Copeland (2005), Canton (2007), Greaker and Rosendahl (2008), Dijkstra and
Mathew (2010), and Nimubona (2012). Among these studies, Canton (2007) extends the
model of David & Sinclair-Desgagné (2005) in an international context, and considers
environmental taxation when abatement activities are supplied by international eco-
industries. Greaker and Rosendahl (2008) use a two-country model with an eco-ﬁrm in
each country, supplying perfectly competitive polluting goods in both countries. Dijkstra
and Mathew (2010) consider the case that an upstream eco-industry is engaged in R & D
for a cleaner technology, selling to a downstream ﬁrm for a license fee. Nimubona (2012)
examines the eﬀectiveness of reduction in trade barriers on environmental goods in a
developing country that imports them from a foreign monopolistic eco-industry.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the eﬀects or eﬀectiveness of trade liberaliza-
tion of environmental goods with trade barriers to ﬁnal goods. We assume a small open
economy that imports both ﬁnal and environmental goods. An environmental good (EG) is
used to reduce emissions of pollution from production of the ﬁnal good. The government of
the country can impose tariﬀs on the ﬁnal and environmental goods and an emission tax
on pollution.
The main results in this paper are as follows. First, whether a reduction in the tariﬀ on
EG increases the welfare of the country or not depends on the level of initial tariﬀ on the
ﬁnal good. In particular, it may decrease the welfare of the country if there is a high tariﬀ
on the ﬁnal good initially. An optimal tariﬀ on EG, however, becomes smaller when the
tariﬀ on the ﬁnal good is reduced and the government chooses the optimal emission tax. In
this case, the total amount of emission does not change even if the government chooses
the optimal tariﬀ on the EG and the optimal emission tax.
The rest of paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe our model and the
market equilibrium conditions. In section 3, we analyze the welfare eﬀects of the tariﬀ on
EG and derive its optimal tariﬀ. In section 4, we examine the eﬀects of the tariﬀ on the
ﬁnal good when the government chooses the optimal tariﬀ on EG and the optimal emission
tax. Finally, in section 5, we make the concluding remarks.
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．The Model and the Market Equilibrium
. The Model
We consider a small open economy with a ﬁnal good and an environmental good (EG).
Both ﬁnal good and EG are imported by the country, but there is no producer of EG in
the country. EG is supplied only by foreign ﬁrms. The home country imposes speciﬁc
tariﬀs, τ and τ, on the import of EG and the ﬁnal good from a foreign country,
respectively. We denote p as the domestic price of the EG in the home country ;
p=p*+τ, where p* represents the international price of the EG. We denote P as the
domestic price of the ﬁnal good, that is P=P*+τ where P* is its international price.
Following the literature (David and Sinclair-Desgange (2005), Canton (2007), Nimubona
(2012)), we assume that the ﬁnal good producers employ an end-of-pipe pollution abate-
ment. The emission level from them is assumed to be given by the additively separable
function : e，a=w −ϵa where a represents the total demand for EG and  is
the output of the home ﬁrms. This emission function is increasing in the total output and
decreasing in the demand for EG. We also assume that the emission function is continu-
ously diﬀerentiable, production generates pollution (w′ >0) with increasing marginal
pollution (w″ ≥0), and the marginal pollution increases at a constant rate (w‴ 
=0).
1)
The abatement eﬀort reduces pollution (ϵ′a>0) with decreasing returns to
abatement (ϵ″a<0), and the marginal eﬃciency of the EG decreases at a constant rate
(ϵ‴a=0).
The home government imposes an emission tax (t) on the ﬁnal good producers since
they emit pollution from their production process. Therefore, the home ﬁrms have an
incentive to import the EG in order to abate pollution and reduce the cost related to
emission tax.
The total demand for the ﬁnal good in the home market is given by DP , and we
assume that this demand curve is downward sloping (D′P <0). The import of ﬁnal good
is given by 
=DP −.
. The Market Equilibrium
Firstly, we consider the behavior of the ﬁnal good producers. The production cost
function of them is represented by c . We assume that this cost function is increasing,
convex, and marginal cost increases at constant rate ; c′  >0, c″ >0 and c‴ =0.
This ﬁrm determines the output quantity and the demand for the EG to maximize its
proﬁt :
( 637 )
Trade Liberalization of Environmental and Final Goods（Abe・Koonsed) 21
π
,a=P−c −pa−tw −ϵa . ⑴
Then, the proﬁt maximization conditions are given by
p=tϵ′a, ⑵
P=c′ +tw′ . ⑶
Because the market of the ﬁnal good is completely competitive, the marginal cost of
pollution abatement is equal to marginal beneﬁt of pollution abatement, and the marginal
cost of production is equal to the domestic ﬁnal goods price.
From Eq.⑵, we obtain the demand for the EG is depend on its domestic price and the
emission tax ;
a=at,p. ⑷
By diﬀerentiating Eq.⑵ with respect to t and p, we have
∂a

∂t
=−ϵ′a
∂a

∂p
=−
ϵ′a
tϵ″a
>0,
∂a

∂p
=
1
tϵ″a
<0.
Analogously, the solution from Eq.⑶ yields the output of the home ﬁrms :

=t,P*+τ≡t,τ. ⑸
This means that the equilibrium output of the home ﬁrms depends on the import tariﬀ
on the ﬁnal good and the emission tax rate. By diﬀerentiating Eq.⑶ with respect to t and
τ

, we have
∂
∂t
=
−w′ 
c″ +tw″ 
<0, ⑹
∂
∂τ
=
1
c″ +tw″ 
>0 ⑺
Undoubtedly, more stringent emission tax leads to less output of home ﬁrms.
On the other hand, the higher emission tax increases the import of ﬁnal goods from
foreign polluters 
∂
∂t
=−
∂

∂t
>0. Furthermore, the liberalization of the ﬁnal good
increases the import from aboard 
∂
∂τ
=D′P −
∂

∂τ
<0.
Next, we turn to consider the eco-industry which produces EG in a foreign country. The
EG producer has a constant marginal cost (g), and maximizes the following proﬁt function :
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π
=p−τ−ga. ⑻
Therefore, we obtain the domestic equilibrium price of EG when its output is positive :
p=τ+g. ⑼
That is, the EG producer sets its price equal to its marginal cost.
Substituting Eq.⑼ into Eq.⑵, we obtain the solution for the equilibrium demand for the
EG ;
a=at,τ+g≡at,τ. ⑽
That is, the equilibrium demand for EG in the home country depends on the emission
tax and the tariﬀ on EG. By diﬀerentiating Eqs.⑵ and ⑼ with respect to t, we obtain
∂a
∂t
=
−ϵ′a
tϵ″a
>0. ⑾
Clearly, when the government raises the emission tax rate, the polluting ﬁrm is willing
to import more of EG to reduce the cost related to the unabated pollution. Analogously,
totally diﬀerentiating Eqs.⑵ and ⑼ with respect to τ, we get
∂a
∂τ
=
1
tϵ″a
<0. ⑿
A raise in the tariﬀ on the EG will decrease the consumption of the EG of the ﬁnal good
producers, regardless of the level of emission tax rate.
．The Eﬀects of Tariﬀ Reduction in the Environmental Good
The social welfare of the home country consists of the sum of consumer surplus for the
ﬁnal good, the home polluting ﬁrmsʼ proﬁts, and the tax and tariﬀ revenues, minus the
social damage due to pollution. We assume an environmental damage function as
ve,a=vw −ϵa  where v is the constant marginal social damage of pollution.
Therefore, the total welfare is described by the following equation.
W t,τ,τ=


Pzdz−PX +P−c −pa−tw −ϵa  
+tw −ϵa +τ+τa−vw −ϵa  ⒀
=


Pzdz−P*−c −tϵ′a−τa−vw −ϵa ，
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where X=+=DP .
From Eq.⒀, a welfare eﬀect of the tariﬀ on EG is given by
∂W
∂τ
=τ−t−vϵ′a 
∂a
∂τ
⒁
From Eqs.⑿ and ⒁ when the initial τ is larger than t−vϵ′a, the liberalization of
EG increases the welfare of the country. This implies that a reduction in the tariﬀ on EG
will always increase the welfare if the emission tax is smaller than the marginal social
damage of pollution.
Next we will consider the case when the government chooses the optimal emission tax
to maximize the welfare by taking τ

and τas given. To solve this problem, by diﬀerenti-
ating this equation with respect to t, we have
∂W
∂t
=t−vw′ 
∂

∂t
−ϵ′a
∂a
∂t +τ
 ∂

∂t
+τ
∂a
∂t
. ⒂
The ﬁrst component of the ﬁrst term of the right hand side, t−v, corresponds to the
gap between the initial emission tax and the marginal social damage of pollution or the
Pigouvian rate. The square bracket part in the ﬁrst term on the right hand side of Eq.⒂
is negative and represents the marginal eﬀect of the emission tax on total emission. The
second and the third terms represent the positive eﬀect of tariﬀ revenue. If t=v, the
negative eﬀect from the pollution disappears, hence only the positive eﬀect from tariﬀ
revenue remains. The home country will gain from stringent emission tax because the
government collects more tax revenue from the imports of both ﬁnal good and EG.
If the initial emission tax is lower than marginal social damage of pollution, t−v<0, the
regulator has an incentive to raise the emission tax to diminish the negative eﬀect from
pollution. In this case, the social welfare increases with emission tax rate. Conversely, when
the initial emission tax is higher than the Pigouvian rate, t−v>0, more stringent emission
tax will not always improve the social welfare.
When we set Eq.⒂ equal to zero and solve for optimal emission tax, we obtain
t=v−
τ
 ∂

∂t
+τ
∂a
∂t
w′ 
∂

∂t
−ϵ′a
∂a
dt
. ⒃
The numerator of the second term on the right hand side corresponds to the positive
tariﬀ revenue eﬀect, and the denominator corresponds to the negative marginal eﬀect of
emission tax on total emission. Therefore, the optimal emission tax is always higher than
the Pigouvian rate regardless of the levels of import tariﬀs as long as they are positive.
Thus, we can summarize this result as follows.
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Proposition 1 Suppose that the tariﬀs on the ﬁnal good and the EG are positive initially.
The optimal pollution tax is higher than the Pigouvian rate.
Substituting Eqs.⒃ into ⒁, we have
∂W
∂τ
=
∂
∂t
∂a
∂τ
w′ 
∂

∂t
−ϵ′a
∂a
∂t
w′ τ−ϵ′aτ. ⒄
Since we know that the sign of the components which are not included in the bracket is
negative, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Suppose that the government sets the optimal emission tax initially. Then we
have
∂W
∂τ
 ⋛0 if and only if τ
⋚
ϵ′a
w′ 
τ.
If the initial tariﬀ on the ﬁnal goods is zero, a reduction of any positive tariﬀ on EG
increases welfare. Conversely, if the initial tariﬀ on EG is small enough so that
τ
<
ϵ′a
w′ 
τ, a reduction in the tariﬀ on EG decreases welfare.
Next we consider the case when the optimal tariﬀ of EG is endogenously determined by
the emission tax and ﬁnal goods tariﬀ. In this case, we must have ∂W /∂τ=0. From Eq.
⒁, given the emission tax and the tariﬀ on the ﬁnal good, the optimal import tariﬀ on the
EG is shown by
τ
=t−vϵ′a. ⒅
The tariﬀ of the EG must be positive when the emission tax exceeds the marginal social
damage. In the case where the emission tax equals the marginal social damage of pollution
(the Pigouvian tax rate), the free trade in EG is the optimal policy. Because the
externality of pollution is fully corrected by the Pigouvian tax, the distortion from the tariﬀ
of EG should be eliminated. When the emission tax is smaller than the marginal social
damage of pollution, the home government should pay a subsidy for the import of EG to
relief the negative externality from pollution.
To see the eﬀects of the emission tax and the tariﬀ on the ﬁnal good, by totally
diﬀerentiating Eq.⒅ we have
1−t−vϵ″a
∂a
∂τ dτ
=ϵ′a1−t−vϵ″a
∂a
∂τ dt. ⒆
Hence, how a change in the emission tax will change the optimal tariﬀ on EG is
( 641 )
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described as
dτ
dt
=ϵ′a>0. ⒇
The optimal EG tariﬀ decreases with the emission tax, and this will be followed by the
following eﬀects.
da
dt
=
∂a
∂τ
dτ
dt
+
∂a
∂t
=
∂a
∂τ
ϵ′a−ϵ′a
∂a
∂τ
=0,
d
dt
=
∂

∂t
<0, 7
de
dt
=w′ 
∂

∂t
<0.
Surprisingly, a change in emission tax will not aﬀect the import of EG. This is because
the direct eﬀect of emission tax is canceled out by the indirect eﬀect through the change
in the tariﬀ of EG. Nevertheless, more stringent emission tax will decrease the output of
the home ﬁrm, and then the emission also reduces.
Next, we consider the impacts of a change in ﬁnal goods tariﬀ. We ﬁnd that the tariﬀ on
the ﬁnal good does not aﬀect the optimal tariﬀ on EG : dτ/dτ=0 Then, from Eq.⒇, the
eﬀects of changing the ﬁnal good tariﬀ are summarized as follows.
da
dτ
=0,
d
dτ
=
∂

∂τ
>0, 8
de
dτ
=w′ 
∂

∂τ
>0.
As already mentioned, changing the ﬁnal good tariﬀ will not aﬀect the EG tariﬀ.
Therefore, when the emission tax is constant, the import of EG will not react to any
change of the ﬁnal good tariﬀ. Nonetheless, the liberalization of the ﬁnal good decreases
home ﬁrm output and emissions. The reason for this is because the lower the ﬁnal good
tariﬀ, the cheaper the domestic price and thus more ﬁnal good is imported from aboard.
Proposition 3 When the government chooses the import tariﬀ on EG to the maximize
welfare by taking the emission tax and the ﬁnal good tariﬀ as given. More stringent emission
tax leads to less output of the ﬁnal good and reduces emissions. The liberalization of the
ﬁnal good does not aﬀect the import of EG, and reduces the output of the ﬁnal good and
emissions.
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@．The Impacts of Final Good Tariﬀ on the Optimal EG Tariﬀ and Emission Tax
In this section, ﬁrst, we consider how the tariﬀ on the ﬁnal good aﬀects the optimal
emission tax and the optimal tariﬀ on EG. We assume that the government maximizes
welfare by choosing the emission tax and the tariﬀ on EG, while the tariﬀ on the ﬁnal
good is given. Substituting Eqs.⒅ into ⒂, we have
∂W
∂t
=t−vw′ −τ
∂

∂t
. A
The optimal emission tax must satisfy the following relation
t−vw′ =τ. B
Therefore, if the initial tariﬀ on the ﬁnal good is positive, the optimal emission tax must
larger than the marginal damage of pollution, that is,
t>v  τ>0 C
In addition, if the tariﬀ on the ﬁnal good is not imposed initially, the optimal emission tax
is equal to the Pigouvian rate.
Furthermore, by combining Eqs. ⒅ with B, we obtain the relationship between the
initial tariﬀ on the ﬁnal good and that on EG
τ
>0  τ>0 D
When the ﬁnal goods tariﬀ is positive, the optimal EG tariﬀ must be positive. If the tariﬀ
on the ﬁnal good is not imposed initially, the optimal tariﬀ on EG must be zero.
A change in the tariﬀ on the ﬁnal good aﬀects the optimal emission tax and the tariﬀ on
EG. First, totally diﬀerentiating Eq.B, we have
dt
dτ
=
1
w′ 
>0. E
Clearly, the liberalization of the ﬁnal good will lower the emission tax rate in home
country. Next, totally diﬀerentiating Eq.⒅, we get
dτ
dτ
=
ϵ′a
w′ 
>0. F
The liberalization of the ﬁnal good must be followed by the liberalization of EG.
Summarizing the results, we obtain the following proposition
.
( 643 )
Trade Liberalization of Environmental and Final Goods（Abe・Koonsed) 27
Proposition 4 Suppose that government chooses the optimal EG tariﬀ and emission tax. A
reduction in the tariﬀ on the ﬁnal good must be followed by a reduction in the emission tax
and the tariﬀ on EG.
We will turn to focus on the impact of a reduction in the ﬁnal good tariﬀ on the total
emission when the government chooses the optimal emission tax and the EG tariﬀ. We ﬁnd
that
da
dτ
 =
∂a
∂τ
dτ
dτ
+
∂a
∂t
dt
dτ
=0. H
A change in tariﬀ on the ﬁnal good will not aﬀect the import of EG because the eﬀect
through the emission tax is canceled out by the eﬀect via the EG tariﬀ. The impact of the
ﬁnal good tariﬀ on the home ﬁrmsʼ output is described as
d

dτ
=
∂

∂τ
+
∂

∂t
dt
dτ
=0. I
Remarkably, the liberalization of the ﬁnal good does not aﬀect the output of home ﬁrms.
The reason is that the direct eﬀect is canceled out by the indirect eﬀect via the emission
tax. This is followed by
de
dτ
=w′ 
d

dτ
−ϵ′a
da
dτ
=0. J
This result is obvious since the liberalization of the ﬁnal good does not aﬀect the output
of the ﬁnal good and the import of EG. So we have the following proposition.
Proposition 5 A reduction in the tariﬀ on the ﬁnal good does not change the level of
pollution if the government chooses the optimal emission tax and the tariﬀ on EG.
Finally, we derive the optimal policy combination among the tariﬀs on the ﬁnal good and
EG and the emission tax. Partially diﬀerentiating the welfare function with respect to τ,
we have
∂W
∂τ
=t−vw′ −τ
∂

∂τ
+τD′P . K
From Eq.B, we get
dW
dτ
=τD′P . L
To maximize the social welfare, the tariﬀ on the ﬁnal good should be totally removed.
That is,
( 644 )
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τ
=0. M
Therefore, from Eqs.C and D, we can conclude that the optimal tariﬀ on EG and the
emission tax are
τ
=0, N
t=v. O
The optimal policy combination is given by the following proposition.
Proposition 6 The optimal tariﬀs on the ﬁnal good and the EG are zero and the optimal
emission tax is equal to the marginal damage of pollution or the Pigouvian rate.
This result is rather obvious. In this small open economy, the removal of all trade
barriers is the optimal trade policy. By doing so, the distortion in trade will disappear.
Then, the government should set the emission tax equal to the marginal social damage of
pollution just to correct the externality from the emission.
Q．Concluding remarks
In this paper, we considered the eﬀects of a tariﬀ reduction of the environmental good in
the presence of the tariﬀ on the ﬁnal good which emits pollution. As we have seen in the
analysis, the eﬀect of a reduction in the tariﬀ on the environmental good or the optimal
tariﬀ of it is closely related to the initial level of the tariﬀ on the ﬁnal good. In our partial
equilibrium model, the tariﬀ on the ﬁnal good aﬀects the optimal level of emission tax. In
addition, the emission tax aﬀects the eﬀects of the tariﬀ on the environmental good. Thus,
the tariﬀ on the ﬁnal good is connected to the eﬀects of the tariﬀ on the environmental
good. The relationship between these tariﬀs has not been pointed out by any previous
paper on this topic.
There are several interesting issues which have not been discussed in this paper. First,
we assume that there is no domestic ﬁrm that produces environmental goods. Some
developing countries, however, have eco-industries and produce environmental goods by
themselves. Some ﬁrms which produce environmental goods are purely domestic ones
while the others are joint-ventures between the home and foreign parent ﬁrms. In these
situations, the eﬀects of trade liberalization of environmental goods may be diﬀerent from
the ones we have derived in this paper. In addition, the market structure of environmental
goods may not be perfectly competitive. It is worthwhile to analyze the eﬀects of trade
liberalization of environmental goods in these situations.
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Next, in this paper we have not dealt with transboundary pollution. Nevertheless, many
kinds of pollution can reaches other countries, e.g., the air pollution from China reaches
Japan and Korea. Therefore, if we include the transboundary pollution in the model, we
should consider the strategies of polluting and polluted countries. A considenable amount of
previous paper deals with transboundary pollution, but it does not incorporate environmen-
tal goods. The analysis induding these goods will be interesting.
Notes
1） In this paper, the ﬁrst, the second, and the third derivative of function f are denoted as f ′, f″
and f‴, respectively.
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